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ABSTRACT
Standard macroeconomic models assume that households are rational in the sense that they are per-
fect utility maximizers, and explain economic dynamics in terms of shocks that drive the economy
away from the stead-state. Here we build on a standard macroeconomic model in which a single
rational representative household makes a savings decision of how much to consume or invest. In
our model households are myopic boundedly rational heterogeneous agents embedded in a social
network. From time to time each household updates its savings rate by copying the savings rate of
its neighbor with the highest consumption. If the updating time is short, the economy is stuck in a
poverty trap, but for longer updating times economic output approaches its optimal value, and we
observe a critical transition to an economy with irregular endogenous oscillations in economic out-
put, resembling a business cycle. In this regime households divide into two groups: Poor households
with low savings rates and rich households with high savings rates. Thus inequality and economic
dynamics both occur spontaneously as a consequence of imperfect household decision making. Our
work here supports an alternative program of research that substitutes utility maximization for be-
haviorally grounded decision making.
conomic growth and inequality are important problems in economics [1, 36]. Standard macroeconomic models are
based on the assumption of a single representative rational utility maximizing agent and assume that the dynamics of
business cycles are driven by exogenous shocks. However, empirical evidence from behavioral economics indicates
that real households are heterogeneous and make substantial deviations from rationality. This has led to new directions
of research, including the incorporation of heterogeneous or boundedly rational agents into macroeconomic models.
This is typically done by allowing the agents to differ in terms of factors such as education while preserving the
assumption of rationality [12, 31, 44], or alternatively allowing for bounded rationality but maintaining utility maxi-
mization [26]. Realism is injected through imposing frictions, such as sticky wages. These models require shocks to
generate economic dynamics.
However, it has long been known that endogenous dynamics are possible in economic models [9, 10, 11, 17, 38],
and more recently Beaudry et al. have shown how limit cycles can emerge in a standard framework where agents
are perfect utility maximizers [5, 6]. An alternative approach bases household decision making on simple heuristics
rather than rationality [18, 19]. This leads to waves of optimism and pessimism, generating irregular business cycles
and giving fat-tailed distributions for economic outcomes such as GDP. We further develop this line of research by
demonstrating how a very simple heterogeneous behavioral macroeconomic model leads to an endogenous business
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cycle that is not driven by externally imposed shocks. Our purpose is not to make a fully realistic model, but rather to
demonstrate that rich emergent behavior can occur even under very simple assumptions.
Here we extend the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans (RCK) model, which is one of the foundational models of economic
growth theory. In this model a representative agent rationally chooses a savings rate in order to maximize discounted
consumption. However, there is ample evidence that households do not act as intertemporal optimizing agents and
often respond myopically [7, 15, 33]. Evidence from lab experiments suggests that individuals perform poorly in
finding optimal consumption paths. In reference [14] subjects deviated from optimal consumption choices by roughly
30 percent on average, increasing to roughly 50 percent when subjects were shown the average consumption level in
the previous period. Learning from past generations’ consumption paths is somewhat more successful, but the errors
are still substantial [3, 13].
We take the opposite approach and assume a strong form of bounded rationality. In our model households are embed-
ded in a social network and make their savings decisions by simply copying their most successful neighbor. They do
this episodically and myopically: From time to time they check all their neighbors and adopt the savings rate of the
neighbor with the highest consumption.
Although we do not claim that this behavior is fully realistic, there is empirical justification for considering a simple
rule of this type. Our agents can be viewed as short-sighted, profligate “conspicuous consumers”, and the tendency
of households to copy one another has been well-documented since the time of Thorstein Veblin [41]. Imitate-the-
best is one of the decision-making heuristics often applied in settings of high uncertainty and variability [27] and is
observed in economic experiments [40]. Savings behavior is highly dependent on social interaction with peers [25, 30,
34, 43] and comparing consumption levels incorporates the visibility bias and selection neglect observed in savings
rate decisions [21]. Our implementation by copying based on consumption alone is partly motivated by the fact that
a neighbor’s consumption is more visible than its capital. This makes it particularly surprising that sometimes their
average behavior can be close to optimal.
We find that a key parameter governing economic behavior is the average time interval τ at which households update
their savings rate, which we call the social interaction time. When τ is small, meaning the households update fre-
quently, the savings rate is low, and the performance of the economy is suboptimal in terms of aggregate consumption.
When τ is sufficiently large, in contrast, the economy-wide aggregate savings rate, which equals the income-weighted
average household savings rate, becomes close to the optimal rate. For small τ the population of households remains
homogeneous, but as τ increases there is a sharp phase transition at a critical value τc where the population becomes
strongly bimodal, dividing into rich households with high savings rates and poor households with low savings rates.
Correspondingly, for low values of τ the GDP and other economic indicators are constant with only small fluctuations,
whereas above the critical transition there is an endogeneous aperiodic oscillation, resembling a business cycle, in
which the aggregate savings rate fluctuates, the population of households alternately becomes richer or poorer, and
economic output varies substantially over time.
Our model shows that the use of heterogeneous agents following explicit behavioral rules can produce aggregate
behavior that is qualitatively different from that of rational agents. Our model is only qualitative, but our results
suggest that an approach that explicitly incorporates empirical behavioral knowledge into household decision making
may naturally lead to an explanation of business cycles in terms of endogenous dynamics.
The standard RCK model
The RCK model considers a closed economy in which a representative household provides both labor and capital for
the production of a single good by a representative firm. The household receives wages w for labor and a nominal rate
of return r on its investment. It spends a fraction 1−s of its income on consumption and invests the remaining fraction
s (see Materials and Methods).
Given the current value of per-capita capital k, the household chooses a current value of per-capita consumption c(s)
determined by intertemporal optimization, leading to an optimal consumption path that maximizes the household’s
long-term discounted aggregate utility. This determines the time evolution of k and c towards a steady state at (k∗, c∗).
An agent-based version of RCK
Economic Model
We introduce a heterogeneous agent model in the tradition of agent-based modeling [8, 16, 20, 22, 28, 32, 39], using
agents that follow a very simple behavioral rule. Our model contains N households labeled by i with heterogenous
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capital Ki. For simplicity, all households supply the same labor Li = L/N . (Introducing heterogeneous labor has
little effect on the results). As in the original RCK model, total economic production is given by the Cobb–Douglas
production function, in this case applied to the aggregate input factors K =
∑N
i=1Ki and L = NLi. As in the
original model, capital returns r and wages w equal marginal returns (Methods, Eq. 7), but incomes Ii now differ
between households,
Ii = rKi + wL/N. (1)
Our key assumption is that each household individually and dynamically sets its time-dependent savings rate si(t)
according to a behavioral decision rule introduced below, leading to household capital dynamics
K˙i = siIi − δKi = (rsi − δ)Ki + wsiL/N. (2)
At the steady state where K˙i = 0, the steady state value K∗i for household i’s capital is a function of the aggregate
capital K via its dependence on w and r, nonlinearly interconnecting all the agents’ savings rates and consumption
levels.
Household Decision Making
While the standard RCK model is a one-dimensional dynamical system in which consumption is a deterministic
function of the total capital, the agent-based version is 2N -dimensional, and aggregate consumption depends on all
households. We assume that each household updates its savings rate at random times1 according to a Poisson process
with rate 1/τ . We will see that τ plays a crucial role for the model’s behavior.
Households are embedded in a social network in which each household i has neighbors N (i). Whenever household i
updates its savings rate, it compares the consumption rates of its neighbors and applies the ‘imitate-the-best’ heuristic,
copying the savings rate of the neighbor with the highest current consumption with a small deviation that can either
be interpreted as an error or as an exploration [35]. More precisely, when the consumption of a neighbor is higher, it
adopts a new savings rate of
snewi = sargmax
j∈N(i)
(Cj) + , (3)
where  is distributed uniformly in the interval of ±1%. (The behavior is insensitive to this as long as there is some
diversity).
Results
We simulate the model for a variety of different parameters such as the average social interaction time τ and the
network topology. In Fig. 1 we show the distribution of the final savings rates as a function of the social interaction
time τ for a complete network with the other parameters fixed. The figure compares this to the optimal, ‘golden rule’
savings rate sgold, corresponding to the rational expectations equilibrium where the consumption of the representative
agent is maximized. There are two distinct regimes, separated by a critical social interaction time τc ≈ 250. In the
stable regime, corresponding to τ < τc, the savings rates of the households are unimodally distributed around a low
savings rate. For very small values of τ the savings rates are close to zero, and the economy is stuck in a poverty
trap in which its output is very low. As τ increases, the savings rate and output increase, but the distribution remains
unimodal, with a sub-optimal aggregate saving rate.
For τ > τc we enter what we call the oscillatory regime, where the behavior is dramatically different. In this regime
the savings rate distribution is bimodal – some households have high savings rates and are quite wealthy, while others
have low savings rates and are very poor. We thus observe the spontaneous emergence of extreme inequality, with a
lower class and an upper class2.
Strikingly, as long as τ > τc, the ensemble average of the aggregate savings rate s˜ is within 1% of the optimal value
sgold = 0.5, even when the individual distributions are bimodal. Furthermore, the time averages of total economic
output Y (t) = 10.15 and consumption C = 4.99 are close to their optimal values Y ∗ = sgoldL/δ = 10 and C∗ =
(1− sgold)Y ∗=5 in the standard RCK model. It seems surprising that such a simple, near zero-intelligence learning
rule can maintain the system this close to its optimal behavior.
The system dynamics become clearer when we look at the economy as a function of time, as illustrated in Fig. 2. For
τ >τc there is an endogenous oscillation in many of the aggregate properties of the economy, including the aggregate
1 This leads to smoother transitions than synchronous updates [24, 42].
2Very near τc the distribution in Fig. 1 is tri-modal. This is due to intermittent oscillations between the unimodal and bi-modal
regimes. Thus the system either exhibits a middle class, or a lower class and an upper class, but never all three at once.
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Figure 1: The critical transition from the stable regime to the oscillatory regime. We perform an ensemble of simulations at different values of the social interaction
time τ , with other parameters held fixed (see SI). We show a heatmap indicating the probability density of the distribution of individual households savings rates for
each value of τ , along with the aggregate savings rate s˜. We compare it to the golden rule savings rate sgold= 0.5 and the savings rate s∗ predicted by Equation (4).
savings rate s˜(t) and output Y (t). This oscillation is also visible in the behavior of individual households. If we
follow any single household it goes through epochs with a high savings rate, near si ≈ 90%, and a low savings rate,
near si≈ 5%. At any point in time there is typically an imbalance between rich households and poor households, so
that the aggregate savings rate and the aggregate output fluctuate. We loosely refer to this endogenous oscillation as a
“business cycle”.
Understanding the stable regime (τ <τc)
Although our behavioral rule requires minimal intelligence, the selection process of copying the household with the
highest consumption provides a simple mechanism of collective search that becomes more effective as the social
updating time τ increases. This is perhaps counter-intuitive, as it means that inattention results in superior collective
outcomes. The underlying explanation is as follows: The savings rate of the household that is copied has on average
been fixed for a time interval of order τ . When τ is small, planning is too myopic, “short term thinking” dominates,
and the households cannot escape using low savings rates with high consumption. As τ gets bigger, however, the time
between updates becomes long enough that there is more time to accrue an advantage by saving, which drives the
savings rate up and increases economic output. The competitive selection process guarantees that for a sufficiently
large population and large τ the savings rates are close to optimal.
We use this intuition to derive an approximate formula for the aggregate savings rate s∗ as a function of τ . We
take advantage of the fact that in the stable regime the distribution is unimodal and assume that all households have
essentially the same savings rate, and derive the optimal savings rate for time horizon τ . As explained in detail in the
Supplementary Information, for capital elasticity α = 0.5 the optimal savings rate under these conditions is
s∗(τ) =
1− e−δτ/2
2− e−δτ/2 . (4)
This approximation is shown in green in Fig. 1 and provides a good fit throughout the stable regime.
The optimal savings rate in the classical RCK model depends on the discount rate ρ, which is a free parameter. As
shown in the SI, substituting s∗ from Eq. [4] into the relation for the classical RCK model gives an effective discounting
rate for our model in terms of the social interaction time τ and the depreciation rate δ,
ρ(τ) =
δ/2
eδτ/2 − 1 . (5)
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Figure 2: The endogenous business cycle in the oscillatory regime. We show several time series when τ >τc. The top left panel shows the savings rates si(t) for four
randomly chosen households as a function of time, as well as the aggregate savings rate s˜. The middle left panel shows the capital Ki(t) of the same four households
as a function of time. The bottom left panel shows the cyclic behavior of the aggregate output superimposed on the aggregate savings rate. The panels on the right are
histograms of the indicated variables, accumulated over a longer interval.
In the limit as τ → 0, the discount rate ρ → ∞, consistent with the observed collectively myopic behavior. But for
τ → ∞, ρ → 0. Thus in this case the individually myopic households act collectively “as if” they were farsighted,
with an emergent effective discounting rate ρ(τ) which is not a free parameter but is rather a function of the social
interaction time τ .
Understanding the oscillatory regime (τ >τc)
To get a deeper understanding of what is happening in the oscillatory regime, where τ > τc, in Fig. 3 we illustrate
the collective and individual dynamics. In Fig. 3A we show the average per capita consumption rate c as a function of
the average capital k. This illustrates how the aggregate consumption and capital orbit around the optimal steady state
(k∗, c∗) of the standard RCK model, generating a business cycle. In relation to the optimal savings rate s∗=0.5 of the
RCK model, the effective aggregate savings rate s˜ is typically greater than s∗ when the system is below the optimality
curve and less than s∗ when it is above the optimality curve. This is interesting as the optimality curve is obtained via
optimizing household consumption for an infinite horizon, whereas our model has no explicit optimization.
To understand what is going on at the individual level, in Fig. 3B we plot a snapshot of the capital vs. the savings
rate for all households at two different times, t1 and t2. At time t1 the economy is just beginning to recover from a
recession. There are two clusters of households, corresponding to rich households in the upper right corner and poor
households in the lower left corner. More households are poor, and because the return r is inversely proportional to
total capital according to r ∝ K−1+α, where here α = 0.5, this means that returns to investment are high. When the
household shown in blue gets its chance to update its savings rate, it copies the higher savings rate of one of the rich
households, transitions to the right as indicated by the arrow, and begins accumulating capital by saving more. Other
households follow, and eventually the economy reaches the state shown in the lower panel at time t2, where many
houses have high savings rates and are rich. The resulting excess capital makes the returns on savings low, which
when combined with their high savings rates, drives the consumption of these households down. As a result, when
one of the rich households gets its turn to update, it copies a household with a low savings rate and goes on a spending
spree. At this point its consumption rate becomes very high, and all of its neighbors copy it, creating a boom in
consumption while decreasing the aggregate savings rate. A majority of households eventually become impoverished
and the cycle repeats itself. These dynamics are also given as an animation in the Supplementary Material.
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Figure 3: Endogenous dynamics in the oscillatory regime. A: We plot the average per-capita consumption c against the average per-capita capital k and show the
aggregate saving rate s˜ as red when it is greater than 0.5 and blue when it is less than 0.5. The trajectory orbits around the optimal steady state (k∗, c∗) of the
standard RCK model, which is at the intersection of the dashed optimality curve and the solid black k˙ = 0 line. Each dot corresponds to one timestep; the orbit is
counterclockwise. B: An illustration of the cause of the oscillatory dynamics. The two panels show snapshots at two different times as indicated in figure A. At time t1
the aggregate savings rate is low, aggregate capital is low and the economy is in a depression; at time t2 the opposite is true. The capital and savings rates of individual
households are shown as dots with different colors. There are two clusters, corresponding to rich and poor households. The household that is currently switching its
savings rate is indicated by an arrow connecting its previous state to its current state. The dashed black curve indicates the iso-consumption curve for the household i
with the highest consumption.
Critical social interaction time
What determines the critical social interaction time τc? The approximation that the imitate-the-best heuristic results in
behavior that is optimal over a time horizon τ helps understand the instability driving the transition. Suppose that an
external shock of size ∆ perturbs the aggregate savings rate s˜ away from s∗, and suppose that household i is allowed
to optimize its savings rate si while the others hold theirs constant. A numerical investigation shows that when τ  τc
the optimal savings rate si computed remains close to s˜. In contrast, when τ  τc, if ∆ > 0 then the optimal savings
rate is very small, with si approaching 0, and if ∆ < 0 the optimal savings rate is large, with si approaching 1 (see
Fig. S3). This happens because when ∆ > 0 the aggregate savings rate is high, so the returns on investment are low,
which discourages saving. Similarly, when ∆ < 0 the aggregate savings rate is low, so returns on investment are
high, which encourages saving. This destabilizes the unimodel solution around s∗. The transition occurs sharply at a
parameter value near τc, though the precise value depends on ∆.
Network size and structure
We have so far used complete networks in the simulations, but in general the behavior depends on the network size
and structure. For example, we investigate Erdo˝s–Rényi networks with average degree 〈k〉 = Np, where p is the
probability that any two nodes are connected. The critical social interaction time τc depends on both 〈k〉 and N (see
Figs. S4 and S5). Starting at any given node and moving one link at a time, the number of neighbors that are reached
grows exponentially with time at rate 〈k〉. The typical distance required for a disturbance to propagate across the
network is the average shortest path length χ, defined as the average number of nodes that must be traversed in order
to go from any given node to any other node. Motivated by this logic, we investigate the empirical relationship between
τc, χ, and 〈k〉, finding the proportionality
τc ∼ e−χ/〈k〉. (6)
Fig. 4 shows that this makes a good prediction of τc. Because χ increases with N , in the large N limit the system is
always in the oscillatory regime. Varying the network size and structure parameters also results in qualitative changes
in the nature of the oscillation, affecting its frequency, amplitude and variability. (See a few examples in the SI).
6
1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2
Avg. shortest pathlength 
102
103
104
k
c
fitted
N= 100
N= 200
N= 300
N= 400
stable
regime
oscillatory
regime
Figure 4: The critical social interaction time depends on network properties. The logarithm of the mean number of neighbors 〈k〉 times the critical interaction time τc
is plotted vs. the average shortest path length χ for various values ofN and p, confirming Eq. [6]. The stable regime (τ <τc) is shaded in blue.
Discussion
Our primary purpose here is to make a conceptual point by demonstrating how emergent inequality and endogenous
dynamics can naturally emerge from a heterogeneous behavioral model. Nonetheless, our model makes the prediction
that during recessions savings rates increase before output rises (see Fig. 2). This has been observed for private savings
in 19 OECD countries [2].
Although our model has two random inputs, they are small and very different in character from the shocks that drive
the dynamics of standard models. The first random input determines the time at which individual households update
their savings rates under the Poisson process. This must be random to ensure that the order in which households update
their savings rates varies. (A fixed order leads to a static economy). The second random input is the copying error for
the savings rate. This is small (1%) and its value makes little difference to the behavior. In contrast to standard shocks,
which affect the economy as a whole, both of these inputs are at the level of individual households, and affect each
household differently. For a large number of households the copying errors cancel out but the endogenous dynamics
nonetheless persist. Thus while random inputs are necessary in our model, they do not directly drive booms and
recessions as the shocks of standard models do. This is why we say that the economic dynamics in our model are
endogenous.
To illustrate the conceptual difference between our model and standard macroeconomic models it is useful to draw an
analogy to a simple physical system. Consider the problem of pole balancing, in which a man attempts to move his
hand to maintain a pole in a vertical position, as shown in Fig. 5. Short poles tip over more quickly than long poles,
Figure 5: The problem of pole balancing is analogous to the problem of optimizing savings in an otherwise unstable economy. A man attempts to maintain a pole in a
vertical position. This is possible if the pole is long enough, but small errors in the control process drive endogenous oscillations in the angle of the pole.
making it impossible to maintain a vertical position because the pole will tip over before the man can react. If the
pole is long enough, however, the man can move his hand to compensate, and maintain the pole in a roughly vertical
position [29]. There is a sharp critical transition between stability and instability that occurs when the pole is about
a meter in length3. Nonetheless, even when the pole is very long, it is not possible to maintain a perfectly vertical
position, and the pole oscillates substantially.
An argument in the style of a standard macroeconomic model would posit that the man is a perfect pole balancer, and
any deviations in the angle must be driven by external shocks, such as sharp gusts of wind, that suddenly cause the
pole to deviate from vertical. Under this view, after each shock the man moves his hand perfectly to make the pole
vertical again as fast as possible, but before he can achieve this, another shock strikes it, making the pole oscillate
around its vertical position. For pole balancing it is clear that this explanation is wrong. Instead, theories that assume
that oscillations are endogenously caused by imperfect control provide a better explanation [29].
3This is trivial to confirm empirically – simply attempt to balance a pole of 60 cm. vs. 130 cm.
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Our suggestion here is that we should revisit the conceptual explanation for business cycles as well. In the analogy
above, the position of the man’s hand is like the collection of household savings decisions, and the pole/gravity system
is like the economy. Our model adds weight to the idea that at least part of the variation in savings and investment
that occurs during business cycles emerges endogenously due to the imperfect reasoning of households and firms.
Our model also suggests that models with heterogeneity might help illuminate the interaction between business cycles
and inequality. The fact that such rich behavior emerges from such a simple model supports a research agenda for
macroeconomics based on empirically derived behavioral rules.
Materials and Methods
Code
The source code (Python) will be made available here upon publication.
The standard RCK model
In our formulation of the standard RCK model, we follow [1, p.287–317], [4, p.85–135] and use continuous time, as in
the original [37]. We ignore labor growth for brevity. Using a fixed amount of laborL and the varying amount of capital
K, the economy produces a single numeraire good Y , assuming a Cobb–Douglas production function Y =KαL1−α
with capital and labor elasticities α, 1−α ∈ (0, 1). Per-capita production, y = Y/L, is thus a function of per-capita
capital, k = K/L, only, y = kα. The model assumes fully competitive factor markets and thus the two factors are
compensated according to their marginal products, giving wages and capital rents
w = ∂LY = (1− α)y, r = ∂KY = αy/k, (7)
thereby fully redistributing the numeraire good to households and leaving the representative firm with no profits. The
main model parameters of interest are the savings rate s ≤ 1 and capital depreciation rate δ > 0 that govern aggregate
and per-capita capital growth,
K˙ = s(rK + wL)− δK, k˙ = r¯k + w − c, (8)
where r¯ = r − δ is the real return rate and c = (1 − s)(rk + w) is per-capita consumption. The household aims at
maximizing its discounted aggregate utility
∫∞
0
dt e−ρtu(c(t)), by choosing an optimal path s(t) for the savings rate,
where ρ > 0 is its discount rate. For the instantaneous utility, one assumes a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
function parameterized by θ ≥ 0, θ 6= 1, u(c) = (c1−θ−1)/(1−θ). The solution to this problem fulfills the Ramsey–
Keynes Equation that gives the relative consumption growth rate as c˙/c = (r¯−ρ)/θ, In particular, this system has two
steady states with c˙= 0, a trivial one in which c= k= 0 and another in which the real return rate equals the discount
rate, r¯=ρ, corresponding to a modified ‘golden rule’ [1, p.300], with capital, consumption and savings rate given by
k∗ =
(
α
ρ+ δ
) 1
1−α
, c∗ = k∗α − δk∗, s∗RCK =
αδ
ρ+ δ
. (9)
For the limit case ρ → 0, this reproduces the Solow model’s golden rule [4, p.35], s∗RCK = sgold =α, leading to the
largest possible sustainable consumption, c∗=(1−α)(α/δ)α/(1−α). For ρ>0, the discount rate pushes the households
to save less and shift consumption towards the present.
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Analytical approximation of the stable regime’s steady state
Here we derive a simple approximate formula for the mean overall savings rate that emerges as a stochastic steady
state in the stable regime where τ < τc..
The main idea is to study which member of an ensemble of households starting at similar but slightly different savings
rates and capital stocks will have the largest consumption after the short time interval τ , and then assume all households
will copy the savings rate of this best household with some error. This is only an approximation since in the actual
model, households do not simultaneously imitate and not after exactly time τ , and the approximation will only be
good when households have already converged to similar savings rates and capital stocks. However, it turns out that it
describes rather well the joint motion towards a steady state once households have converged towards each other. In
particular, the steady state savings rate predicted by the approximation can be seen to match the one observed in the
numerical observations quite well.
To see how individual households’ consumption at time τ depends on their individual savings rate, we need to ap-
proximate the evolution of r and thus of total capital K first. Assume all households’ savings rates si are close to the
overall savings rate s and stay constant between time zero and time τ . Then K evolves as
K˙ = (rs− δ)K + wsL
=
(
α
( L
K
)1−α
s− δ
)
K + α
(K
L
)1−α
sL.
For α = 1/2 this simplifies to
K˙ = s
√
LK − δK. (S1)
Assuming that s does not change before time τ , this has two solutions given by
K(t) =
(B − Ee−δt/2
δ
)2
,
r(t) =
√
L/K/2 =
A
B − Ee−δt/2 ,
w(t) =
√
K/L/2 =
B − Ee−δt/2
4A
(S2)
for all t < τ , whereA = δ
√
L/2,B = s
√
L, andE has the two possible values s
√
L±δ√K0. Since we are interested
in the case where r is positive, we have E = s
√
L− δ√K0 < B.
Knowing r(t) and w(t), we can now determine which household consumes most after time τ . Household i’s capital
Ki(t) evolves as
K˙i = (sir(t)− δ)Ki + wsiLi
=
(
siA
B − Ee−δt/2 − δ
)
Ki +
B − Ee−δt/2
4A
siLi.
This has an analytical solution involving complicated hypergeometric functions. For small values of τ , we can simplify
the problem by approximating r(t) and w(t) for t ∈ [0, τ ] by their mid-term values r(τ/2) and w(τ/2), giving
K˙i ≈ GiKi + Fi
with Gi = siAB−Ee−δτ/4 − δ and Fi = B−Ee
−δτ/4
4A siLi, which solves as
Ki(t) ≈ (Ki(0) + Fi/Gi)eGit − Fi/Gi.
1
The corresponding consumption of household i at time τ is then
Ci(τ) = (1− si)(r(τ)Ki(τ) + w(τ)Li)
≈ (1− si)
(
H((Ki(0) + Fi/Gi)e
Giτ − Fi/Gi) + Li/4H
)
with H = A
B−Ee−δτ/2 =
A
s
√
L(1−e−δτ/2)+δ√K0e−δτ/2 . Since we assume all households imitate at time τ that si which
has led to the largest Ci(τ), we can determine whether s will increase or decrease by identifying whether the si that
gets copied is larger or smaller than s. Since we also assume households’ savings rates si are distributed closely
around s and all Ki(0), Li are similar, this question can be answered by seeing whether Ci(τ) increases or decreases
when si is increased from below s to above s, i.e., by studying the derivative ∂Ci(τ)/∂si at the point si = s. Up to a
factor of N , this derivative is
(1− s)H
[
eGτ − 1
G
(L/4H −HF/G) + eGττH(K0 + F/G)
]
−H[(eGτ − 1)F/G+ eGτK0]− L/4H (S3)
where F = B−Ee
−δτ/4
4A sL and G =
sA
B−Ee−δτ/4 − δ. As long as the above expression is positive or negative, s will
increase or decrease over time, respectively.
A steady state will then be reached when both s and K change no longer, i.e., when both K˙ as given by Eq. [S1] (with
K = K0) as well as ∂Ci(τ)/∂si as given by Eq. [S3] are zero. The solution of K˙ = 0 is K0 = Ls2/δ2, at which
point we have E = 0, H = δ/2s, G = −δ/2, F/G = −Ls2/δ2 = −K0, HK0 = Ls/2δ, and HF/G = −Ls/2δ =
−HK0. Substituting all this into Eq. [S3] and setting it zero gives the following surprisingly simple approximate
equation for the steady state s:
s? ≈ 1− e
−δτ/2
2− e−δτ/2 (S4)
as stated in the main text.
Simulation details
For all simulations in the main text, we have used the following parameters unless otherwise stated: µL = 1/N,K(t =
0)i = 1∀ i and a fully connected network with N = 100, δ = 0.05. We have found that adding small heterogeneity
in each household’s labor does not change the dynamics significantly and the equilibrium dynamics also remain the
same for different initial capital distributions with different
∑
iKi = K. For Fig. 1, savings rate distribution plots
are shown at the final state of the simulation at time 5τ · 103, far beyond the point where the model has reached its
asymptotic dynamics. For each value of τ , 200 independent simulations are run and all values of si are recorded for
each τ to construct a histogram, which is normalized so the values add to one for each set of simulations with the
same τ . In Fig. 4, Erdo˝s–Rényi random graphs are constructed such that every node is connected to every other node
to avoid households that are static and depreciation rate is δ = 0.2 to speed-up computation.
Savings rate dependency and topology
In Fig. S1, we show the mean values for aggregate savings rates for the two modes of the oscillatory regimes. We
can observe values ranging from 2%–23% for the lower savings rates and from 65% to 90% for the higher ones.
Furthermore, we can see that the values for the high savings rates are strongly anticorrelated with the values of the
lower savings rates, as they still average to s? = 0.5.
Effective time-preference rate
In the RCK model, the discount rate is a free parameter, and the representative household solves the intertemporal
optimization problem by choosing a savings rate of
s∗RCK =
αδ
ρ+ δ
(see Methods section from the main paper). In contrast, in the stable regime of our agent-based model, the myopic
behaviour of the many individual households that learn their individual savings rates by social learning with a mean
social interaction time τ leads to an aggregate savings rate s that converges to a steady state s? which is approximately
s?ABM ≈
1− e−δτ/2
2− e−δτ/2 ,
2
as derived above. So, the main household characteristic that determines s?RCK is the discount rate ρ, while the main
household characteristic that determines s?ABM is the social interaction time τ . Comparing the above two equations,
we see that a given social interaction time τ in the ABM leads to approximately the same aggregate savings rate as the
discount rate
ρ(τ) =
δ/2
eδτ/2 − 1
in the RCK model. Conversely, a given discount rate ρ in the RCK model leads to approximately the same aggregate
savings rate as the social interaction time
τ(ρ) =
2
δ
ln
(
1 +
δ
2ρ
)
in the ABM. This relationship between ρ and τ is shown in Fig. S2 for various depreciation rates δ. Higher depreciation
rates lead to lower discount rates, which is due to the dependence of s∗ABM on δ and the inverse relationship between
the classical economically optimal savings rate s∗RCK with ρ. Thus, a higher depreciation leads to an increasing
preference for the future. While maybe counterintuitive at first, it can be explained by the fact that s∗RCK is obtained
from the optimization of a representative agent which requires a higher savings rate for higher rates of depreciation
for optimal consumption.
In the case where either δ or τ are small or ρ is large, we even have ρ ≈ 1/τ , which means that the discount rate of
the RCK model almost exactly corresponds to the social interaction rate of our model.
Single household free-riding
We have seen above that, given an ensemble of households with an aggregate savings rate s, the individual consump-
tions Ci will approximately evolve as in Eq. S3. If the ensemble of households is large enough, it will contain some
household j that uses a savings rate close to the value of si which maximizes Eq. S3. Let us call the latter the best
response to s and denote it by s?i (s). Since household j is then the most-consuming member of the ensemble, the
social learning implies that other households will start copying sj ≈ s?i (s), after which s will move slightly towards
s?i (s) as well. We have seen that when s equals the value s
?, also s?i = s
?, so that s? is an equilibrium. It turns out
that for values of s slightly above s?, we get s?i < s
?, and for values of s slightly below s?, we get s?i > s
?. Since
updates occur asynchronously, after some stochastic perturbation of s away from s?, this implies that s moves back
towards s? with some inertia, so that those households which imitate s?i first in such a situation have a temporarily
larger consumption than the others.
Interestingly, the difference between the best response s?i (s) and the equilibrium s
? depends strongly and highly
nonlinearly on τ , as can be seen in Fig. S3. For τ below some critical value, s?i (s) is very close to s
?, which explains
why not only the aggregate savings rate s but also all individual savings rates si remain close to s? in the stable regime
of our model. However, for τ above the critical value, s?i (s) is close to zero if s > s
? and very large if s < s?,
converging to unity as τ increases. So as long as s > s?, more and more households will switch to si ≈ 0, making
s decrease until s < s?, after which more and more households will switch to very large si, making s increase again,
leaving fewer and fewer households at intermediate values of si. This explains the emergence of two separate classes
and extreme inequality in the oscillatory regime of our model. In both cases, those households with a countercyclical
savings rate can be seen as “free-riding” on the behaviour of the others. When s < s?, those households with large
si accumulate capital and get high rents due to an overall scarcity of capital. When s > s?, wages and thus incomes
increase due to the overall abundancy of capital, so those household with small si profit from consuming a larger share
of their temporarily large income.
Dependence of the critical interaction time
In Fig. S4 and Fig. S5, we show an alternate views of Fig. 4 in the main text. Here we show the dependency of τc on
the mean number of neighbors 〈k〉 and the number of households N and the link density p. We see no clear alignment
without using the average shortest path length as done in the main text.
Examples of qualitatively different oscillations
Varying the network architecture and the number of agents simulated not only changes the value of τc but also the
frequency of the oscillations. We show 300 time step intervals in the oscillatory regime for various simulations using
Erdo˝s–Rényi random graphs [S1] in Fig. S6 and Watts-Strogatz “small world” [S2] networks in Fig S7. We can find
3
that decreasing the number of agents and the social interaction time τ increases the roughness of the aggregate capital
curves indicating multiple oscillation frequencies with different amplitudes.
Using the depreciation rate per time step δ to roughly correspond to the real-word depreciation per year, we find that
the large oscillation frequencies are generally in the range of 50-100 years and smaller oscillations (e.g. lower panel
in Fig. S7) in the range of 15-20 years. These results show that, while the main oscillation frequency is too low for
a typical business cycle, this model can generate various oscillations with different frequencies that are superimposed
on each other, similar to economic waves.
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Figure S1: Dependence of the high and low savings rates on the network topology. We show the mean values of the savings rates in the lower mode with s < 0.5,
(left) and the higher mode with s > 0.5 as a heatmap. We can see a range of different values that depend on the topology of the network.
100 101 102
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
(
)
= 0.80
= 0.20
= 0.06
= 0.01
Figure S2: Effective discount rate as a function of the social interaction time. The corresponding discount rate ρ(τ) = δ2 (e
δτ/2 − 1)−1 of our model is shown for
various depreciation rates δ and low social interaction times τ < τc.
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Figure S3: Best response dynamics. Optimal individual savings rate s?i (circles and triangles) given a very small perturbation of either +∆ (blue circles) or −∆
(orange triangles) of the aggregate savings rate s away from its equilibrium value s? (green line) as a function of the social interaction time τ , for ∆ = 10−7. Below a
critical value of τ , best responses are very close to the equilibrium value, while above the critical value, they diverge quickly towards very small or very large values in
the opposite direction of the perturbation, thereby stabilising s but leading to temporary profits due to the countercyclical exploitation of large rents (if s < s?) or large
wages (if s > s?).
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Figure S4: Critical interaction time τc as a function of the network mean degree. Here, τc is shown as a function of network size N for different mean degrees, given
by 〈k〉 = Np for Erdo˝s–Rényi graphs [S1] and α = 0.5, δ = 0.2 and the critical rate increases with the mean degree 〈k〉.
6
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
N
101
102
cr
it
p = 0.1
p = 0.3
p = 0.5
p = 0.7
p = 0.9
p = 1.0
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Figure S6: Various oscillation patterns for different Erdo˝s–Rényi graphs. The parameters are given in the titles of the figures. We can see that decreasing the number of
agents and decreasing the social interaction time τ increases the roughness of the aggregate capital curves. Note that labor is initialized as 1/N so that the equilibrium
capital is constant for all simulations.
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Figure S7: Various oscillation patterns for different Watts-Strogatz graphs [S2]. The parameters are given in the titles of the figures. We can see that decreasing the
shortest paths length (by decreasing the rewiring parameter p, leads to a more rough aggregate capital curves with multiple frequencies. Note that labor is initialized as
1/N so that the equilibrium capital is constant for all simulations.
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